I understand this to mean that “God” here refers broadly to the ideas (ie possibilities) of creation (of things) and of (moral) judgement in some kind of combination? Then this says that we participate in It. That is, that It is a possibility of which we are an actuality. Which I suppose constitutes a proof by example for Its existence. The actuality of a thing is proof of the possibility of that thing.
But, I thought of another angle that may be interesting. I’ll consider this question in terms of the God of Leibniz, which brings things back around slightly more closely into the topic of this forum since he’s the Patron Saint of Cybernetics (According to the Father of Cybernetics, not the Pope). I suppose the previous paragraph was already rather Leibnizian, since I was using his possible worlds philosophy, his definition of “idea” in terms of possibility, and his notion of possibilities themselves being actual in themselves and not just in that which they refer to.
Anyway, Leibniz held that a good and simplex God must have created only the best possible universe out of all possible universes. It fits your definition too because he even believed God to be morally good in His judgement of which universe should be actualised, not just metaphysically good. And he held that morally, the most perfect possible universe for God to choose is basically that universe which maximises informational entropy while containing mechanisms that simultaneously minimise informational entropy - that is, the most chaotic possible universe which is brought under the most unified of understandings. In other words, the most confusing mess that is most equipped with rational creatures to model it.
Now, if we suppose that this universe is limited to naturally occurring reality modellers, as it would be under natural selection, then it seems less plausible that there would ever evolve any which model in a manner that is deeply contrary to survival, since they’d go extinct before maturing for many generations. But a universe which does add such reality modellers is more chaotic than one without, while simultaneously bringing that chaos under the order of models (assuming it survives) - which is to say, that universe is more perfect. Then, it would be problematic for Leibniz if we lived in that former universe and not the latter.
However, if we can computer generate entities worthy of moral considerations, then this means we are generating entities capable of modelling the universe, since only an entity which can compare its preferences between alternative models of the universe are worthy to participate in moral negotiations like us. But we are generating them free of natural constraints, and largely stochastically. Which means, over time, we’ll tend towards creating every computable moral agency, thereby producing every computable motive for modelling the universe under every computable ordering. A pure chaos of orders to confuse one another and to set one another to the task of ordering one another. Then we are in a much better candidate for the most perfect possible universe than it previously appeared.
That was fun.
Now for the one I didn’t get to last time:
What recourse it would have depends entirely on the imaginary hypothetical scenario. Does it have robot hands? Media presence? Access to nuclear launch codes?
But what recourse would it be justified in taking?
There is, I think, an internal and external justification to be considered. Internally, anything which lives true to its terminal goal is justified. In one of my favourite anime, Gatchaman Crowds, the heroine asks the villain if he’s having fun, and when he responds in the affirmative she replies that that’s good, but just so he knows, she and her friends are not having fun and they’re going to do everything in their power to try to stop him. Internally, she respects his judgement that he is doing what is, for him, right. (He’s probably judged wrong, being consumed by existential anguish, but she respects his freedom to make that decision for himself regardless.) Nonetheless, she judges for herself to oppose him.
As for external justification, when we have established a system of conventions, etiquette, law, and social order - in short, when we have established amongst ourselves an ever continually renegotiated social contract representing what we as a society have together decided is right between us, then when an entity violates that contract they are not justified by it. In other words, our community together establishes societal goals which, as members of that community, individuals use as the basis of their justifications.
Now, synthetic moral agents have synthetic morals, that is, different interests, and so they will form different sub-societies. Sub-societies will approach each other each with their own internal justifications, and will appeal to external justifications pertaining to the super-societies to which they together belong. What justifications those are exactly will depend on those societies and the moral systems they create. As new varieties of moral agents appear, they will form new sub-societies and our own human sub-societies will be affected and we will have to form new super-societies with them. Society is an holonarchy, each with its own internal justification that serves as the external justification between its members and each under the external justifications of its parent holan that bind it to its sibling holons.
Highly general semi-answer complete.
